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ABSTRACT
One of the most influential strategies to justify human rights available in 
the specialized literature is centered on the notion of autonomy. Such a 
strategy assumes that civil and political and socioeconomic human rights 
are equally essential to lead a minimally autonomous human life. This 
article examines whether the ideal of autonomy can really provide support 
to the view proclaimed in the Covenant that socioeconomic human rights 
must be realized progressively, according to “the maximum of available 
resources”. To do so, I focus on the conceptual relation between the ideal of 
autonomy and a fundamental dimension of moral deliberation which is 
often overlooked in the debate, namely: the cost of error in decision 
making. In a nutshell, I argue that once this key variable considered, it 
becomes evident that any measures governments may implement to 
promote the realization of social and economic human rights must be 
subject to democratic control.
Keywords: economic and social human rights, autonomy, progressive 
realization, cost of error, democratic legitimacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most common philosophical strategies used to justify human 
rights – including both civil and political rights (CPHR) and socioeconomic 
ones (ESHR) – appeals to the notion of autonomy. Cécile Fabre provides a 
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particularly persuasive example of such strategy (Fabre 1998), 1 which may 
be applied to the normative justification and juridical interpretation 
of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).2 
Her ultimate aim is to prove that socioeconomic rights must be 
constitutionalized because both socioeconomic human rights and civil 
and political ones perform the very same normative function: they preserve 
the value of personal autonomy.  
Following authors such as John Rawls (1993), Joel Feinberg (1972) and 
Gerald Dworkin (1988), Fabre insists that in spite of its obvious liberal 
origins, the principle that individuals have a fundamental interest in 
personal autonomy may be accepted by people holding the most diverse 
doctrines of the good. In her own words:
“Autonomy captures an essential characteristic of human beings, which 
distinguishes them from other beings, namely their ability rationally 
and morally to decide what to do with their life, and to implement these 
decisions, over long periods of time, so as to lead a meaningful existence 
and through it develop an awareness of the kind of persons they are” 
(Fabre 1998, 265).
So we have reason to respect people’s autonomy because autonomy is 
an essential component of the human condition: only autonomous persons 
can fully develop their human nature. In this vein, Fabre sustains that civil 
and political rights have normative importance precisely because they are 
necessary to preserve our autonomy: freedom of expression, freedom of 
conscience, freedom of association and freedom of movement are obviously 
crucial to enjoying control over one’s own life. In fact, when such freedoms 
are not protected, individuals become unable to choose and revise their 
own life-plans in the most fundamental sense. The same is true of political 
rights:
“If it is important that I have some degree of control over my life, then 
surely it is important that I have some degree of control over the social 
and political environment within which I lead my life: electing 
representatives in Parliament, voting in referenda and running for 
office myself are means to acquire that control” (Fabre 1998, 266).
1 Although human rights can undoubtedly be derived from other normative ideals, 
Fabre’s argument is particularly relevant. This is because autonomy, under different 
formulations, has played a central role in liberal thought from Kant and Mill down to the 
most significant thinkers in the 20th Century, with John Rawls’ theory of justice (1971 and 
1993) in the front line. On the other hand, the notion of autonomy has played a crucial role in 
the specific field of human rights justification: the theories of Alan Gewirth (1982) and 
James Griffin (2008) are excellent examples.
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According to Fabre, the above considerations explain why civil and 
political rights must be constitutionalized and protected from majoritarian 
decision making. Importantly, Fabre insists that socioeconomic rights are 
equally important to preserve the autonomy of individuals: 
“Giving these resources –income, education, housing, etc.– to people is 
important because without them they would be unable to develop the 
physical and mental capacities necessary to become autonomous. If we are 
hungry, thirsty, cold, ill and illiterate, if we constantly live under the threat 
of poverty, we cannot decide on a meaningful conception of the good life, 
we cannot make long-term plans, in short we have very little control over 
our existence” (Fabre 1998, 267).
The main goal of this paper is to suggest that even if socioeconomic 
human rights are relevant to preserving the autonomy of individuals, there 
are cogent autonomy-based reasons to resist their constitutionalization. 
Of course, this does not mean that the satisfaction of socioeconomic 
human rights should not be regarded as a political priority by democratic 
societies. It simply means that any specific decisions about their 
implementation must remain under ordinary democratic control: neither 
courts, nor experts are authorized to make unilateral decisions to ensure 
their fulfillment under the clause of progressive realization according to 
the maximum of available resources. In this sense, the paper provides 
support for one particular understanding of what specific obligations 
governments have under current international law: while the fulfillment 
of subsistence needs is certainly a high priority mandate, they cannot be 
enforced by courts or public policy experts. How to implement them must 
be decided by the people.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I discuss a demanding 
interpretation of article 2 (1) of the Covenant and explain why it is 
problematic, at least if we accept that human rights are grounded on the 
value of autonomy. In section 3 I develop an original argument in favor of 
adopting a more modest interpretation of state’s commitments under 
present International Law. Such argument sustains that when our actions 
involve serious risks for the interests of others, they cannot be implemented 
unless their implementation is authorized through democratic or 
representative mechanisms. Otherwise, the autonomy of those affected by 
our actions is seriously compromised.  In section 4 I discuss an important 
objection to my view, according to which lack of expert knowledge on the 
part of citizens may render democratic authorization unpalatable in the 
context of extremely poor societies. Finally, in section 5 I present some 
concluding remarks.
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2. AUTONOMY AND THE PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF 
SOCIOECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS
The view that value of autonomy may justify the authority of both civil and 
political human rights and at least some socioeconomic ones, appears to 
be plausible in principle. In this vein, the 1966 UN Covenant proclaims 
human rights to adequate food, decent housing, fair and just conditions of 
work, health and education. Nevertheless, because in present conditions 
their immediate satisfaction may be unfeasible, the Covenant also asserts 
that their realization should be progressive and that states must invest the 
maximum of their available resources to achieve their realization. This is 
how article 2(1) is framed:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.
As we see, article 2(1) constitutes and attempt to re-articulate the idea 
that socioeconomic human rights are of major normative importance even 
in contexts where resources are scarce: although some states may lack the 
resources required to bring about their immediate realization, they must 
nevertheless use all the resources at their disposal to ensure their 
satisfaction in the shortest period of time. Otherwise, they would be failing 
to live up to their international commitments. However, the very notion of 
progressive realization according to the maximum of its available resources 
is opaque. It can be interpreted in a number of ways. 
On a demanding interpretation, article 2(1) implies that states must 
devote all their resources to promoting socioeconomic rights, unless this 
implies undermining the satisfaction of other human rights, such as civil 
and political ones. In the context of developing countries, this account is 
vulnerable to two interrelated objections. The first objection is that it may 
seriously undermine the political autonomy of citizens. To see why, 
imagine that a government elected by a majority of votes proposes to 
implement a number of political reforms in order to improve the economic 
performance of the country. The nation is poor and the government wants 
to achieve a reasonable level of economic development. If the plan is 
incompatible with the progressive realization of ESHR in the terms 
mandated by the Covenant, then it will be indefinitely blocked, even 
though it is supported by a majority of citizens. Of course, this does not 
imply that economic development is more valuable than ESHR; rather, the 
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point is that on the demanding interpretation, the Covenant may erode the 
political autonomy of the people, understood as their freedom to make 
collectively free decisions about their social environment. Predictably, 
such restriction of political agency will have a negative impact over 
individuals’ personal autonomy as their capacity to control important 
aspects of their lives would be curtailed.
The second problem has to do with the burdens that bringing about the 
realization of ESHR may have over the population. On the demanding 
interpretation, governments are obliged to use all the resources they can 
find to ensure their progressive satisfaction. In many cases, this will force 
them to impose heavy taxes on their most productive sectors at the expense 
of economic growth. So even if such measures increase the present capacity 
of the government to deliver on socioeconomic human rights, this strategy 
may nevertheless render the society poorer in the long run. Furthermore, 
there are persistent disagreements as to what measures can most effectively 
promote the realization of ESHR. Most likely, liberals, social democrats 
and socialists will propose alternative programs to achieve that goal and 
insist that the rival strategies are problematic as they may end up eroding 
the very values they aspire to promote. As a result, the demanding 
interpretation of article 2(1) is seriously incomplete as societies have no 
clear orientation about the exact policies it calls for.
3. AUTONOMY AND THE COST OF ERROR
The above considerations point to another problem which is often 
overlooked in contemporary debate: in scenarios where the costs of 
undertaking mistaken courses of action are particularly high, the ideal of 
personal autonomy involves some particularly stringent demands. To see 
this, consider the following example:
Imagine that two scientists, A and B, plan to carry out some experiments 
that prove necessary for the development of different technological 
applications of a particular theory. The chances of success are 
identically high in both projects. The scientists’ work is not moved by 
prudential reasons, but by moral ones: both are persuaded that the 
result of their work will imply a significant improvement in the quality 
of life of their community. Assume also that A and B have equally sound 
reasons to make such moral judgment. Therefore, they both have a 
fallible moral knowledge that provides a pro tanto reason to act. There 
is, however, an important difference between both cases: the cost of 
error. If A’s research fails, this poses no substantial costs to the wellbeing 
of third parties. The situation is very different in B’s case: should her 
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research fail, it will cause serious and irreparable harms to a substantial 
number of people – say, B’s research requires a kind of experimentation, 
which may be extremely dangerous for the environment and for people’s 
health.3
This thought experiment suggests that when a moral agent deliberates 
on how to act, she must not only make a moral assessment of the various 
courses of action at her disposal; rather, she must also consider the cost of 
error each alternative involves – such as those of making a false moral or 
factual judgments.4 
So how are we to interpret the situation of scientists A and B from a 
moral perspective?  Both are in similar conditions to think that they know 
– albeit fallibly – that the following statement is true: “Proceeding with my 
research is the best alternative from a moral point of view, since the result 
of such decision will bring about a significant improvement in life-quality 
for members of the community.” Consequently, they also seem to be 
equally morally justified to act on the basis of such judgment and continue 
their work on their research projects. The latter statement, however, is 
deeply problematic: there are cogent reasons to believe that while A is 
effectively justified to act on the basis of her factual and moral knowledge, 
such is not the case with B.  
The above conclusion may be thus backed. It is obvious that A is morally 
justified to act based on her knowledge. From an epistemic perspective, A 
is justified in subscribing the factual and moral tenets we attribute to her, 
and they constitute enough reason to act accordingly. Should something 
go wrong, neither A nor any other persons involved would endure any 
damage. Yet, the analysis varies as we move to a context in which the costs 
of error are drastically high. To see this, imagine for a moment that one 
aspect of B’s situation is different from what we described above: error-cost 
is very high but it only concerns the scientist’s welfare, not that of third 
parties. Although B firmly believes that her research will be successful, she 
is aware that in cases of error her experiments could be dangerous for her 
own wellbeing. B might decide that it is not worth running the risk, even if 
the chances of failure are very low; or she might alternatively decide to run 
the risk and proceed with his research. Both courses of action appear 
equally acceptable from a moral perspective. But what happens when, as 
in the original example described, other people could be seriously harmed 
3 This example, applied to the moral field, is modeled after some well-known cases in the epistemologi-
cal debate around contextualism and pragmatic encroachment: DeRose’s bank case, Cohen’s airport case and Fantl 
and McGrath’s train case. See DeRose (1992), Cohen (1999), and Fantl and McGrath (2002).   
4  Interesting exceptions to the tendency to overlook the relevance of the cost of error in the process of 
moral deliberation are  Thomson (1986), McKerlie (1986), Lockhart (2000), Hansson and Peterson (2001), and 
Hansson (2003).
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if B is mistaken? B may research further and try to diminish the probability 
of error.  However, since time is limited examining all potential sources of 
mistake is impossible. 
From an epistemic perspective, there is no way out of this situation. No 
matter how solid the arguments and evidence displayed by B, those who 
could be harmed have the right to refuse taking the risk: B is not entitled to 
decide in their name as this would undermine their equal moral status. In 
other words, in case B did so, she would fail from a moral perspective in her 
relationship with those agents. Why should B arrogate herself the special 
prerogative of deciding in the name of others, without their consent or 
some kind of authorization? Why might B deprive these people of their 
right to make a decision that may prove crucial for their lives? If B neglects 
such fundamental moral right, she would be treating those involved as 
mere instruments for the achievement of her own goals, rather than agents 
whose interests and projects have a weight of their own and are irreducible 
to interests and projects of other individuals. In essence, if B acted 
unilaterally in the way she judges best from a moral perspective – despite 
having good reason to presume her judgment is correct – she would infringe 
the autonomy of the potential victims – in Fabre’s terms, this would entail 
depriving them of holding significant control over their existence.
With this in mind, we can now reexamine the problem of implementing 
ESHR. As we saw, it is plausible to hold that the moral reason why ESHR 
must be fulfilled is that they prove just as indispensable as CPHR to respect 
people’s autonomy. However, in view of the large amount of economic 
resources required – particularly within unfavorable contexts – complying 
with ESHR demands launching dangerous economic experiments; and in 
case of error, this may bring about substantial damage to the people (both 
those who lacked the chance to have access to the resources necessary to 
enjoy those rights and those who did have access to them prior to the 
implementation of the necessary redistributive policies). So as in the case 
with scientist B, when the state unilaterally decides to enact risky economic 
measures, it undermines its citizens’ autonomy. Consequently, at least at 
first sight, we have reached a dead end: while ESHR are grounded on 
respect for people’s autonomy, implementing them in contexts such as 
those described proves incompatible with such very grounds, namely: 
respect for the autonomy of individuals.
Fortunately, there is a solution to the paradox. Let us assume that B 
manages to persuade all the potential victims to allow her to proceed with 
her research: they all decide to voluntarily run the risk, having received 
sufficient information about its potential costs. In such case, should B 
decide to carry out her experiment she will not be acting unilaterally, nor 
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violating the autonomy of others. She is not running the risk in their name; 
all share responsibility for the decision. Similarly, it is reasonable to hold 
that, under certain conditions, democratic resolutions with a high level of 
legitimacy may have the same result. We can imagine in this vein that B’s 
decision to proceed with her research results from a free and open deliberation 
process in which all the relevant information was circulated, all those 
concerned were part of the process, and the decision was backed by a majority.
Whenever these conditions obtain it is reasonable to say that, through 
their participation in the political process, all those concerned have 
authorized the decision – or, at least, none can protest that the decision 
was arrived at with no previous consultation. Of course, the kind of 
authorization provided by democratic procedures may not amount to 
unanimous consent.  Yet neither unanimous consent nor the effective 
consent of all concerned is expectable within the context of ideological 
pluralism that pervades contemporary democratic societies. But it is 
generally accepted that a democratic procedure governed by majority rule 
is an adequate substitute of unanimous consent – at least when it complies 
with stringent legitimacy standards.
Now if we admit the legitimacy of the democratic system in general, 
then we must also accept that such system offers an appropriate instrument 
of authorization, both in the case of scientist B and, more broadly, in the 
selection of public policies in which the cost of error is significantly high. A 
committee of experts, or members of a tribunal, may certainly believe that 
a certain policy will promote the welfare of the people better than the 
others. However, if the cost of error is highly significant, they will not be 
morally justified to act unilaterally based on their (fallible) knowledge. For 
if they did so, they would be deciding in the name of others, thereby 
undermining their autonomy and their status as independent moral 
agents. In cases where fallibility is combined with the high cost of error for 
the wellbeing of those concerned, knowledge is not enough to justify action 
from a moral point of view. By contrast, the situation is radically different 
when that kind of decision results from an inclusive democratic process: 
even if not everyone agrees, implementing the policy that receives a 
majority vote is not comparable to a unilateral decision. In sum: if we 
assume that democracy is a valuable political system, we must also accept 
that it constitutes an adequate tool to authorize the implementation of 
risky measures in way that respects the autonomy and equal status of 
individuals. 
Similar considerations apply in the case of decisions about the amount 
of resources to be devoted to comply with the ESHR included in the 
Covenant. If the measures to put them into practice are the end result of a 
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process of democratic authorization with high levels of legitimacy, the cost 
of error will not have the moral implications described above. Plus the fact 
that it cancels the plausibility of the notion that implementing ESHR, no 
matter how risky, violates the autonomy of those concerned.
4. DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL AUTONOMY AND SCARCITY
There is an important potential objection I need to tackle before concluding.5 
The argument I am suggesting is grounded on a connection between 
autonomy and democratic deliberation. However, it could be countered 
that although such connection is plausible in conceptual terms, it is 
nevertheless unrealistic in the context of most developing nations. This is 
because citizens of such nations may lack the capacities or resources to 
engage in sophisticated economic debates. As a result, their autonomy 
could perhaps be better promoted through alternative means, such as 
decision making by courts or technical experts. In the example of the 
scientists, it was argued that B has no right to decide in the name of others 
because this would be incompatible with honoring their equal moral 
status. Yet one may recognize the equal moral status of individuals while 
at the same time insisting that they have no capacity to understand or 
contribute to complex technical debates. 
So if scientist B enjoys genuine expertise on the subject matter, she may 
legitimately refuse to take into account the views of others. Along the same 
lines, it could also be argued that when basic human needs are not secured 
and people lack adequate education and reasonable access to information, 
democratic debate and democratic authorization may not be the best 
option to promote the autonomy and wellbeing of individuals.
Nevertheless, the argument I have offered precludes the kind of 
epistocratic view underpinning this objection. As David Estlund points 
out, epistocracy tends to rely on three fundamental tenets:
The Truth Tenet: there are true (at least in the minimal sense) 
procedure-independent normative standards by which political 
decisions ought to be judged.
The Knowledge Tenet: some (relatively few) people know those 
normative standards better than others.
The Authority Tenet: The normative political knowledge of those who 
know better is a warrant for their having political authority over others. 
(Estlund 2008: 30)
5  I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for Law, Ethics and Philosophy for 
raising this key objection.
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The case of the scientists accepts the first two tenets, which look more 
or less plausible. It accepts the second tenet because it assumes that 
scientist B enjoys some privileged expert knowledge by virtue of which she 
knows that a certain course of action is the better one; and it accepts the 
first tenet as the claim that B’s knowledge is independent of any particular 
decision making mechanism. However, my account firmly rejects the 
Authority Tenet: since knowledge is in principle fallible, and the experiment 
involves high costs in case of mistake, then B is not morally allowed to act 
on her own personal assessments of merit. This is because even though her 
potential victims may lack relevant technical knowledge, they have a 
fundamental right to veto any unilateral decisions on the part of B. To 
enjoy such right they just need to know that the costs of a mistake are high 
for themselves and that the chance that the scientist is mistaken is 
significant. Thus, the only solution is to achieve the consensus of those 
who may be potentially affected by the experiment or, alternatively, to 
setup reliable mechanisms of democratic authorization. The same is true 
of citizens living in poor countries: they are entitled to resist any unilateral 
decisions adopted by epistemic elites, ranging from courts of justice to 
expert policy makers. 
On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing that, contrary to what the 
objection appears to presuppose, these kinds of decisions hamper the 
moral autonomy of individuals rather than just their political autonomy. If 
scientist B unilaterally decides to go on with her experiment under the 
assumption that this will significantly benefit her community, she not only 
undermines the political autonomy of the potential victims but also fails to 
respect their status as separate moral persons endowed with an intrinsic 
dignity. And the same is obviously true of an elite of experts who make 
unilateral public policy decisions that may compromise the interests of 
those in their power. 
To illustrate the point, imagine that after considering a set of alternative 
economic policies – P1, P2, P3 – a group of economic experts concludes that 
P1 is the best option. If P1 is successfully implemented, it will considerably 
improve the life prospects of the people. Yet, if the strategy fails, it will have 
a devastating impact on low and medium income classes. It is evident that 
in such case the experts are not morally allowed to impose their views on 
the citizenry. For even if the experts know that P1 is the best policy, they 
have a fundamental moral duty not to impose serious risks on others or 
decide in their name on matters that may seriously compromise their vital 
interests.
Of course, the existence of a minimally legitimate democratic system 
requires that at least the most basic socioeconomic needs of the people are 
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fulfilled. In this sense, the duty to satisfy certain ESHR is supported by 
distinctively democratic considerations: such rights are preconditions for 
a genuine democratic deliberation. In fact, when people lack adequate 
education and are deprived of the means of subsistence, political autonomy 
is a chimera. Yet, even if the satisfaction of ESHR constitutes a political 
priority, this does not imply that courts or experts can make unilateral 
decisions as to how to implement them. Since any such decision would 
presumably involve considerable risks, they call for democratic 
authorization. Naturally, when a nation is desperately poor, or when 
minimally reliable democratic frameworks are absent, we may have to 
consider other options. But in most present developing democracies, it is 
up to the people to figure out what specific policies must be implemented 
in order to promote their satisfaction and honor their commitment with 
human rights instruments.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conclusion of my argument is that even if we admit that ESHR are 
essential to the development and enjoyment of genuine autonomous 
agency, their unilateral implementation by governments or courts may be 
morally unjustifiable in many contemporary societies. Fundamentally, 
this is because in view of the extreme costs their implementation may 
involve, unilateral implementation violates the autonomy of individuals. It 
is important to emphasize, however, that this implies no skeptical view 
about the feasibility of ESHR or about their normative status. On the 
contrary, the account I propose suggests that governments and citizens 
are morally obligated to engage in democratic conversation about what 
measures to undertake in order to fulfill ESHR and grant this issue a 
privileged role in public debate. Within such political processes, people 
must compare rival interpretations of the “progressiveness” and 
“maximum available resources” clauses and their precise implications. 
Yet, if they want their human rights policies to be legitimate, they must 
result from democratic decisions about what risks the political community 
is willing to run to fulfill them.
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